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CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR. By
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.
Pp. xii, 196. $8.95.
Carl Kaysen '
Oliver Williamson's Corporate Control and Business Behavior is
an important contribution to the old but ever-lively examination of how
and how effectively competition regulates economic activity. Though
he speaks in mathematical language, and addresses himself primarily
to economists and theorists of organization and management, Professor
Williamson has a broader message for all those concerned with the
public policy of competition.
Corporate Control examines how the internal organizational arrangements of business firms affect the efficiency of their operations.
It begins with the familiar proposition that the structures of many
important markets in our economy are not such as obviously enforce
competitive behavior. Large size in relation to markets, large absolute
size, legal limitations on entry, and other kinds of restrictive regulation
certainly raise the question of the degree to which the thousand or so
largest firms in our economy that together produce a major part of
total output are compelled by market forces to approximate the efficient
behavior of the profit-maximizing competitor of economic theory.
Viewed from the inside, all these firms are large enough to require a
complex, multi-layer, hierarchical structure of managerial control. For
firms in this universe, Professor Williamson analyzes the extent to
which the character of internal organization reinforces or substitutes
for market forces in pushing the firm toward efficient, profit-maximizing
behavior. He treats the questions almost entirely in theoretical terms,
using certain simple basic concepts of the theory of organizations as
tools for examining the effect of organizational structure on both the
firm's definition of goals and its effectiveness in achieving them.
The analysis investigates the properties of two types of organization: U-form (unitary) and M-form (multi-divisional), although the
author recognizes that some complex firms-which he terms freeform-are really neither one nor the other. The U-form firm is one
that is organized along functional lines, with executives immediately
below the chief executive as heads of departments; say, for a typical
manufacturing firm, manufacturing, marketing, engineering and research, and finance. The top management of such a firm consists
essentially of the chief executive and his cabinet of functional vice
t Director, Institute for Advanced Study. A.B. 1940, University of Pennsylvania;
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presidents. By contrast, the M-form firm is organized in terms of a
number of divisions distinguished by product line or geographic market
area or both, each of which is headed by a divisional executive, responsible for all the division's operations. Under him, the individual
division can be thought of as typically organized in U-form. The
M-form firm, however, is more than a federation of U-form divisions
under a single corporate head. Equally characteristic and significant
for it is the existence of a strong staff organization attached to the chief
corporate executive, with an appropriate complement of functional
specialists, as well as generalist staff officers. The top management of
the M-form enterprise consists of the chief executive and the divisional
executives. It is thus made up of men who have no functional operating
responsibilities, but an overall view of either some subset of markets
of the firm, or the whole set. This group of generalists is reinforced
by a strong staff, without parochial loyalties and responsive to the
interests of top management.
Professor Williamson sees the U-form as in some sense the natural
organizational form into which a firm grows as its size increases. By
contrast, the M-form is an organizational innovation, which originated
in the twenties and thirties (Du Pont and General Motors) but which
has begun to spread widely only in recent years.
Professor Williamson's discussion of the large U-form is a restatement with some amplification of his earlier work on the subject,
especially The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm.1 Firms of this type experience two
kinds of control problems. The first is simply the general problem
of information loss in a hierarchical organization as information is
transmitted up the hierarchy and instructions down it. Combined with
the limited rationality of the human mind-its finite information
processing and storage capacity-information loss sets limits on the
efficiency with which a firm can operate. In principle, this phenomenon
is no different from others that economists treat in discussing economies
and diseconomies of scale. The second control problem is specific to
the tasks of inter-functional coordination in the large U-form enterprise,
and arises from the nature of its top management. Because it is essentially composed of representatives of functional interests, the topmanagement group finds it impossible to deal with peak-level coordination problems from the general firm, or profit-maximization,
point of view. Rather it seeks accommodation amongst the inevitably
conflicting functional viewpoints of its members. Seen in another setting, this is the familiar problem of interservice rivalry, and the consequent limitations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a military policymaking
body concerned with the total national defense. In Professor Williamson's language we have utility maximization instead of profit maxi10.

WILuAmSON, THE ECONOmiCS OF DIScRErIoNARY

OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FuI

(1967).

BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL

890

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.119

mization: in the absence of enough competition in products to enforce
the latter, the former is the natural result of the organizational pattern.
Further, competition in the capital market cannot function as an
effective substitute for competition in products markets and so produce
the desired results. Neither the incentive effects of stock options,
insider trading, and the like, nor the threat effects of possible takeovers
can be sharply enough focused to induce managements to choose profitmaximizing goals at the cost of other elements of managerial satisfaction. In large part, Professor Williamson sees the "external" character of capital-market controls as the key to the obtuseness of their
effects.
The economic significance of these consequences of U-form
organization in large firms operating in less-than-competitive markets
goes far beyond the technical resource misallocations that departures
from competition entail. It is rather the internal inefficiency of the
firm-its failure to use factor inputs at the greatest efficiency-that is
Williamson's prime concern. This is especially important in a dynamic
context, and sluggishness in both searching out opportunities for cost
reduction or profitable market expansion and exploiting them are the
important costs of widespread departures from competition.
The difficulties of interfunctional coordination in the U-form enterprise and its consequences are characteristically significant only in the
large firm. In the small firm, the individual chief executive can himself
carry the whole load of interfunctional coordination (with assistance
from a personal staff). Therefore his own goal orientation can rule,
and if it is a profit-maximizing one, so will be the firm's. But, even
at a scale that is small in relation to the range of firm sizes Professor
Williamson considers, the one-man show is inadequate to the task, and
the typical "cabinet" of functional executives becomes the organ of
peak coordination.
Professor Williamson, drawing on the work of Alfred Chandler,
Jr.,2 sees the beginnings of the M-form innovation in the response of
troubled managements to sharp crises or sustained business difficulties.
Its originators saw it specifically as a way to improve central control
over the diversified activities of their large enterprises, and to orient
them all more sharply towards profit maximization. The essential
virtues of the M-form are in its two characteristic attributes: topmanagement coordination is the task of a group of men each of whom
has generalist orientation toward profit rather than a specialist one
toward some particular function; that group is reinforced by a strong
staff loyal to it and capable of assessing the information that comes up
from lower and specialized hierarchical levels of the organization in
terms of overall corporate goals. In Professor Williamson's own
words:
2A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE (1966).
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The argument can be summarized in the following way:
the transformation of large a business firm for which
divisionalization is feasible from a unitary to a multidivision
form organization contributes to (but does not assure) an
attenuation of both the control loss experience and subgoal
pursuit (mainly staff-biased expansion) that are characteristic
of the unitary form. Realization of these attenuation effects,
however, requires that the general office be aggressively constituted to perform its strategic planning, resource allocation,
and control functions. Both the form and substance of multidivision organization are required for this transformation to
be effective. Expressed in conventional goal pursuit and
efficiency terms, the argument comes down to this: the organization and operationof the large enterprise along the lines of
the M-form favors goal pursuit and least-cost behavior more
nearly associated with the neoclassical profit maximization
hypothesis than does the U-form organizational alternative.3
Indeed, a properly organized M-form management pushes the
operations of its business toward the goal of profit maximization, in
dynamic as well as static terms, in just the way the capital market
cannot. In such a firm, top management operates chiefly in terms of
capital allocation, deciding which divisions and subdivisions to expand,
which to allow to shrink or even abandon, and, especially, what potential
new markets are worth exploration and development. Because management's controls are internal rather than external, and its informationgathering activities can be focused sharply and in detail on the specific
aspect or segment of a situation under study that most needs elucidation,
it can do all these things more effectively than the general capital market
operating on the firm from the outside.
The gains of M-form organization are not limited to those internal
to the individual firm; there are system effects as well. In particular,
a universe in which numerous large, well-managed M-form firms
actively seeking profitable new opportunities coexist with a constantly
renewed population of small, specialized firms devoted to the technical
realization of new ideas provides an ideal arrangement for rapid innovation. The small specialists are often better suited to the task of
translating new technical possibilities into products; the large firms to
the task of organizing their manufacture at large scale and low cost,
and developing the markets that make such manufacture economically
possible. Typically, the transfer of the new product from the initial to
the subsequent phase will occur through the acquisition of its technical
developer by a large, divisionalized, diversified firm. Another positive
system effect is the institutionalization of "potential competition" over
3 0. WILLAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR
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a wide range of markets consequent on the systematic efforts of the
large M-form firm to search out profitable investment opportunities.
Readers of this review who are students or practitioners of the
public law of competition will by now have noticed a familiar ring to
the arguments so briefly summarized above. And indeed, rightly so.
They are-in different language and more subtle form-the arguments
of defense counsel in conglomerate or even sometimes more traditional
merger cases; or of business spokesmen in general when anti-trust
issues are discussed in the public forum. And indeed, Professor
Williamson does-to be sure, with some caution-draw the policy
implications of his analysis. He urges the wisdom of less stringent
control of mergers, especially conglomerate ones, and the value of taking
organizational advantages explicitly into account in judging them.
That the arguments of the book under review parallel to some
extent popular and frequently repeated business arguments on the same
subject speaks in no way against their value or validity. Indeed, the
contrary is nearer the truth. When an economist of Professor Williamson's theoretical power and sophistication, and intimate practical experience with the enforcement of the antitrust laws, repeats these
arguments and provides them with an analytical basis, they should be
doubly attended.
Aside from all that, what can we say of the power of Professor
Williamson's analysis to support the kind of policy conclusions he
suggests, with no matter how much caution or qualification? An
answer to this question must begin by reminding the reader of the
highly abstract and formal character of Professor Williamson's argument. The leading question is then, how well does the organizational
model of the book describe the essential behavior of observable large
firms which appear to have an M-form organization, insofar as it concerns the central point of the nature of corporate objectives and the
efficacy with which they are attained? To find a convincing answer
to that question would require extensive field studies of a large number
of M-form firms planned so as to permit an evaluation of Williamson's
model. This has not yet been done. But the beginnings of such an
endeavor are visible in a number of studies of the management of the
investment process in large firms which have been made at the Harvard
Business School. One of these, Joseph L. Bower's Managing the
Resource Allocation Process (1970), was published recently, and it
refers to a number of others, all unpublished doctoral dissertations done
in the last several years at the Harvard Business School. None of this
work is mentioned by Professor Williamson.
Bower's book reports a detailed case study of resource allocation
in a single giant firm, designed to examine the extent to which its
managerial processes were effective in guiding investment decisions by
profit-maximizing criteria. Bower's sample firm was clearly an M-form
organization. Equally clearly, its behavior did not conform to Professor

1971]

BOOK REVIEWS

Williamson's model. The discrepancy lay precisely in the failure of the
control structure to provide a strong linkage between high level criteria
of return on investment by which investment opportunities were supposedly judged, and the operating level criteria by which they were
actually judged. These Bower termed "strategic" rather than rateof-return criteria, centering on forecasts of market share and other
indices of competitive position. Frequently, though not uniformly, the
use of these criteria was "rigged" to serve the segmental interests of
the operating unit, in a way that was proof against the review processes
of higher levels.
This case study shows no more than the possibility that an enterprise organized in M-form can fail to provide the drive to long-run
profit-maximizing behavior that Williamson's model embodies. A large
number of similar studies might both show how often such failures
occur and point to what aspects of organization explained them. Yet
even the single instance suggests the level of abstraction at which
Professor Williamson argues is too high to catch the phenomena he
seeks to explain.
Nonetheless his argument is important. Its central proposition
that examination of the internal structure of the large firm is an indispensable element in understanding its relation to the markets in
which it operates cannot be dismissed and should not be ignored.
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ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS. By TED J. FIFLIS
AND HOMER KRIPKE.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1971.
Pp. XLIV, 687. $14.00.
Martin J. Aronstein t
Not too long ago, the typical law school offering entitled "Accounting for Lawyers" consisted of a cursory study of double-entry bookkeeping. If the neophyte lawyer could tell a balance sheet from an
income statement, a debit from a credit, and, in rare cases, an accrual
from a deferral, not much more could be or was expected. Accounting
was regarded as a quasi-mechanical art conducted by people with green
eyeshades and quill pens who periodically produced financial statements
at which lawyers occasionally looked.
Since about the end of World War II there has developed a
growing awareness among legal educators that terms like "net profit"
and "book value" cannot be adequately presented as mere arithmetical
representations of facts but, like so many other legal concepts, must be
exposed as the products of judgment, opinion, negotiation, and, unfortunately, a fair measure of confusion. When substantive matters of
heroic proportions turn on financial statements, it is essential that the
lawyer have an understanding of the assumptions and conventions, i.e.,
the accounting principles, upon which such statements are based. The
existing teaching materials are well-designed to communicate that
understanding in order that the lawyer can properly evaluate the extent
to which the accountant's product can be relied upon and the extent to
which it cannot. For example, a lawyer drafting a shareholders' crosspurchase agreement must be able to exercise an informed judgment
whether a price based on book value of the stock of that corporation is
a fair expression of the parties' intent or a trap for the unsophisticated.
A continued source of wonderment to the uninitiated student (and
a fountainhead of classroom drama for the teacher) has been the
immense range of possibilities embraced within the ambit of "generally
accepted accounting principles." During the past two decades the
accounting profession has diligently devoted itself to the task of narrowing that range within more acceptable limits. Almost every pronouncement of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) has promulgated rules which diminish the possibility that
a given set of facts can be portrayed in more than one way. There is,
of course, a long way to go in that direction; but an eminently acceptable
approach to the teaching of accounting in law schools is to keep up to
date with the latest opinions of the Accounting Principles Board of the
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.E. 1944, Yale University; M.B.A. 1948, Harvard University; LL.B. 1965, University of Pennsylvania.
Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
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AICPA and to delineate the areas in which new ones are needed. That
attitude is succinctly stated in a quotation presented in this book: "What
the accountant tells us may not be true, but, if we know what he has
done, we have a fair idea of what he means." 1
Professors Fiflis and Kripke are not content with that approach.
They maintain that accounting principles are, in no small measure,
matters of law. These principles fix the limits of distributions to shareholders under the corporate law. They are the heart of the disclosure
process under securities law. They play a crucial part in determining
the rates paid by the public to regulated utilities. They affect the
public revenue under the tax laws. They are incorporated in a wide
variety of private contracts. Since they are law, say the authors,
lawyers, to perform their traditional role, should have a hand in their
formulation. And to perform that task adequately lawyers must do
more than merely understand what the accountants are doing. They
must be able to evaluate whether what they are doing is right.
To help the lawyer achieve that ability, this book is intended to
convey a pervasive understanding of both the practices and the
philosophy of accounting. It contains, throughout, excerpts from both
the legal and accounting literature which not only explain what the
system is but criticize its failure to provide information useful to those
whom it is presumably designed to serve. New and sometimes revolutionary approaches are suggested. Any resemblance to the "Accounting
for Lawyers" texts of thirty years ago is purely coincidental. This is a
law book-and a very good one.
Since one cannot read the literature without first learning the
language, this book begins with a chapter on bookkeeping. Like its
counterparts in similar works, Chapter I is the product of the authors'
individual teaching styles and experiences. The process by which facts
become journal entries and, subsequently, financial statements is one
which each teacher should communicate in the manner best suited to
himself. It is my view, however, that Chapter II, which, in eleven rich
pages, discusses the relationship of law to accounting, the underlying
conventions and assumptions, and the respective roles of management,
the accounting profession and government agencies, might profitably be
assigned as reading during the period in which Chapter I is being
covered in class. The drudgery of journal entries and work sheets can
be somewhat assuaged by a concurrent attempt to demonstrate their
relevance.
The authors' analytical approach is most clearly evidenced by
Chapter III, in which they explore the threshold question of income
recognition, properly described as "the single most important and
pervasive problem of accounting." Through descriptions of presently
sanctioned exceptions to the normal requirement of realization, e.g., the

1T. FrFLIS & H. IarPKE, ACCOUNTING FOR BusiNmss LAWYERS 305 (1971),
quoting language from Boulding, Economics and Accounting: the Uncongenial Twins,
in STUDIES N ACCOUNTING THEORY 44, 54 (W.T. Baxter & S. Davidson eds. 1962).

896

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

(Vo1.119

valuation of securities by investment companies and percentage-ofcompletion accounting for long-term contracts, they subject the nearsacred realization concept to critical evaluation. The three chapters
that follow deal with the allocation of costs-intangibles, depreciable
tangibles, and inventory-in a manner made more meaningful by the
prior discussion of .income recognition. The net result is a perception
of accrual and deferral as a series of policy decisions rather than a
collection of mechanical rules.
Several distinct accounting problems are dealt with in a single
chapter. Of these, bad debts, bond discounts, and surplus reserves are
surely each worthy of an hour of class time, and many teachers may
choose to explore them in greater detail. The authors have elected to
give them short shrift in order to reserve valuable page space for
in-depth studies of problems which are the subjects of more current
debate. Among these are interperiod tax allocation, discussed in the
context of the normalization/flow-through dispute in utility rate regulation, lease financing, and the purchase-pooling imbroglio with its
attendant problems concerning the amortization of acquired goodwill.
The timeliness of these problems and their intimate relationship to the
concepts of income recognition justify devoting a chapter to each of
them, even at the expense of curtailing the attention allotted to the more
familiar teaching vehicles.
Three chapters are devoted to problems of fair presentation. The
by-passing dilemma is discussed in the context of four fact situations
which include the sale by two giant corporations of their controlling
interest in Ethyl Corporation and the statements issued by Westec on
the eve of its bankruptcy. The compulsive fixation of the financial
community on earnings per share is demonstrated and criticized, with
particular attention to the effect on reported earnings of changes in
accounting methods. Finally, the authors raise the basic and intensely
disturbing question whether modern cost-based accounting merely fails
to inform or affirmatively misrepresents.
My first reaction to Chapter VII was that its discussion of pricelevel and fair-value accounting was heady stuff designed for consumption by economists, financial analysts and accounting theoreticians.
Certainly, I thought, it had nothing to do with lawyers. Upon reflection, however, the connection becomes clear. Recently authorized
departures from traditional cost-based accounting, like percentage-ofcompletion, have been at least tacit recognition that, in some instances,
the value of the certainty of historical fact is outweighed by its tendency
to mislead. Fair-value accounting may never be adopted for general
use, but surely some aspects of its approach will be reflected in future
proposals for change. If lawyers are to play a role in the development
of accounting principles, as the authors insist they should, they must be
familiar with the theories expounded in Chapter VII. Though this
book would be complete without Chapter VII, it is a better book for
having included it.
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Particularly praiseworthy is the final chapter, Legal Liability of
Accountants-a comprehensive review of the development of that topic
from Ultramares' to the modern trilogy of BarChris,3 Yale Express4
and Continental Vending.' If the student is left with the impression
that the law in this area is far from clear, he has at least been brought
up to the level of the practicing bar. However one might view the
participation of lawyers in the formulation of accounting principles, the
matter of accountants' liability is surely lawyers' law and cannot be
properly appreciated without an understanding of the environment in
which the accountant operates and of the tools at his command.
Perhaps the most significant of the many strengths of this book
is its intimate connection with business reality. As early as the first
chapter the authors describe that "piece of business sophistication"
known familiarly as the "inventory cushion" and how it can be translated into an appealing earnings record in anticipation of a public
offering. The first week of classes is not too soon for the student to
learn that financial statements and the truth are not invariably
synonymous. The book is liberally sprinkled with examples of actual
business practices: the sale of equipment to franchisees; 6 the taxsheltered depreciation deal;" the compensating-balance requirements of
lenders; ' the acquisition price contingent on future earnings; 9 and the
sale and leaseback ' 0 -to mention just a few.
While the authors are forceful advocates of the positions they
favor, they are sometimes less than objective in presenting those they
oppose. Whatever one might think of the merits of LIFO, it is clearly
a widely used practice of inventory pricing in American business.
Despite that fact, the authors confine their discussion to an eleven line
There are, after all,
description " and a three page condemnation.'
some respectable and reasonably persuasive arguments in favor of
LIFO. But even if the reader is to be deprived of those, he is entitled
to the opportunity to develop his understanding and make his own
evaluation on the basis of a more complete discussion than the authors
provide.
In a similar vein, while extolling the theoretical virtues of fairvalue accounting, the authors have failed to convey, at least in a way
2

Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
3 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
4Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
5 United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1006 (1970).
spra note 1, at 136.
6 T. FiFLis & H. Kp.Rn,
71 d. 226.

8Id. 329.

9 Id. 344.
'ld. 518.
11 Id. 246.
12d. 264-66.
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that came through to me, a full appreciation of the enormous difficulties
of appraisal once the cost concept is abandoned. Fair value, whether
used in the Internal Revenue Code, the Bankruptcy Act, or in financial
statements, is perhaps as subjective a term as there exists in a lawyer's
vocabulary. It may be that the split of opinion between the academicians and the practitioners in the accounting profession rests
squarely on the fact that the former may never have seen first-hand the
strange things that can happen when one asks an "expert" to appraise
something at its "fair value." Surely, Professor Kripke knows the
score, but nowhere in this book does he get around to telling it like
it is. The good work of the AICPA during the recent past in improving the objectivity of financial statements would be eclipsed by the
wide adoption of fair-value accounting with the present state of the
appraiser's art.
I do not disparage the continuing search for truth in financial
statements which the profession is carrying on assiduously and which
the authors heartily commend. I despair, however, of ever finding the
answer. In one excerpt reprinted in the book it is stated that "[tIhe
only satisfactory solution is for the accountant to accept the challenge
of producing statements that come as close as possible to meeting the
economist's requirements." 3 Perhaps that is the only satisfactory
solution for economists. But there are other groups whose requirements may be quite different from those of the economists, and no less
important. The tax collector, the lender, the labor union negotiator,
the selling shareholder, the investor, and the executive with an incentivecompensation plan are all users of financial statements. In my opinion,
Professors Fiflis and Kripke do not sufficiently emphasize the fact that
no matter what principles are ultimately adopted the job of interpreting
financial statements from the users' divergent points-of-view will always
be imposed on the users and their lawyers.
Accounting for Business Lawyers is appropriately titled. It is a
book which every business lawyer might profitably read and from
which even the most sophisticated can learn. It is a book which ought
to be read by every teacher of business law-not just teachers of
accounting, but teachers of corporations, securities regulation, creditors'
rights and even contracts. It is a book which law students with a
particular interest in business law should be encouraged to read, not
only for the accounting learning, but for the insights into the business
environment which the authors so amply provide.
Whether it is a book appropriate for every law student who can
be enticed into electing a course in accounting is a harder question.
I do not believe, as the authors suspect some will, that "the book is
over the heads of many law students." 14 It may, however, go a great
13 Id. 313 (emphasis added) (quoting H. Ross, THE

15 (1966)).
14d. XII.
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deal deeper than many care to venture and I am frankly fearful of discouraging the many students who want to know something about
accounting for the sake of those who want and ought to know a great
deal. Perhaps the only way to answer the question is to spend some
time in the classroom with Fiflis and Kripke and a mixed bag of history
majors, political scientists, and business administration graduates, all
one-third on their way to becoming lawyers.
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NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY.
By TELFORD TAYLOR. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1970.
Pp. 224. $5.95.
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.I have very little fault to find with Professor Taylor's exposition
of the law, both our own constitutional law and the international law of
war, applicable to the hostilities in Vietnam. It appears accurate, lucid,
and reasonable-an extraordinarily good summary, for the lay as well
as the legal reader, of some extraordinarily difficult legal problems. In
particular, I am in complete agreement with his conclusion that the law
of war, as difficult as it may be to apply and enforce, is very much better
than no law at all. Its existence has averted a great deal of suffering in
the wars which have afflicted our species during the last half century
or so.'
I have, of course, a few caveats about some of Professor Taylor's
suggestions. For example, while agreeing that it might well be
preferable to try the American soldiers accused of war crimes in the
Song My incident before special military commissions composed of
civilian lawyers and judges, instead of before courts-martial, I have
some doubt whether that could legally be done. Certainly, if I were
counsel for one of the accused, I could make a strong argument that
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice 2 he is entitled to trial by
general court-martial, with all the protection that implies.
Likewise, I have greater doubt than Professor Taylor as to the
validity of the so-called "Nuremberg defense," a concept which in
essence would permit an individual lawfully to refuse to obey orders to
participate in training for combat in Vietnam, to go to Vietnam, or even
to report for induction, on the ground that compliance with such orders
would put him in a position in which he would be compelled to commit
violations of the law of war.3 My trouble with the concept is that I do
not believe its basic premise. With few exceptions, the only violations
of the law of war for which people have been punished have been
deliberate, voluntary acts which the perpetrators must have realized
were war crimes and which they were under no real compulsion to
commit. An American soldier of ordinary intelligence and ordinary
moral courage certainly can refrain from committing war crimes without fear of legal punishment, and he probably can do so without fear
of extralegal penalties. Indeed, it seems obvious that the great majority
of American soldiers do so refrain.
' Richard Ely Professor of Law, Yale Law School. A.B. 1936, Dartmouth
lege; LL.B. 1940, Harvard University. Member, District of Columbia Bar.
I

T.
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2 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964).
3
T. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 15.
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But even on these matters Professor Taylor's position and mine
are not very far apart. Overall this is a commendable book. I would
feel much happier about the world if such a work could be published, or
even read, in China or Russia or North Vietnam.
I agree also with Professor Taylor's conclusion in his chapter
on Aggressive War that the "crimes against peace" principle of the
Nuremberg Charter cannot usefully be applied to the fighting in Vietnam, any more than it can be applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict. One
of the many unique things about Adolf Hitler was that he scarcely
bothered to claim that the Third Reich was the victim of aggression.
World War II was one of the very few wars in history in which it
could be said with something like certainty which side started it. On
the evidence available, I incline toward the opinion that North Vietnam
bears the major part of the responsibility for the breach of the 1954
Geneva Accord 4 and the initiation of violence in South Vietnam; but
the situation is sufficiently tangled so that I am left with that reasonable
doubt which, under our system of criminal law, forbids a conviction.
The core of the book is devoted to breaches in Vietnam of the conventional law of war. There can be no doubt that American soldiers
have sometimes-far too often-been guilty of violations of those provisions of the Geneva Conventions which are clearly applicable, particularly in the mistreatment and killing of noncombatants and prisoners
of war who were not in a position to commit hostile acts.' The Song
My massacre, whoever was responsible for it, is an example of such a
clear violation, although as Professor Taylor recognizes, 6 it seems to
have been an extraordinary and perhaps unique episode. And, as
Professor Taylor says, even it "pales into . . . insignificance" 7 when
compared to some of the atrocities committed by the enemy.
Indeed, it may be that the root of the problem is exposed by
Professor Taylor when he points out that North Vietnam and the
Vietcong simply refuse to be bound by the conventional law of war.'
Professor Falk, like their other champions, argues in substance that
military necessity justifies that refusal.' As a practical matter, this
argument cannot be lightly brushed aside. It is clear that if they, or
the Palestinian guerrillas, were to adhere to the Hague Regulations,' °
the Geneva Conventions,"' and the rest of the conventional law of war,
particularly the fundamental principle that combatants are to be dis4
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, in IV MAJOR PEACE
TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY: 1648-1967, at 2689 (F. Israel ed. 1967).
5 See, e.g., conventions cited note 13 infra.
6 T. TAYLOR, .'pra note 1, at 139.

7Id. 171.
8 Id. 135-36, 173.
DId. 137, citing 2 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE VIErAm
WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 240 (R. Falk ed. 1969).
'0 Annex to Convention between the United States and other Powers Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295 (1911).
"1 See, e.g., conventions cited note 13 infra.
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tinguishable from, and as far as possible separated from, noncombatants,
they would have small chance of military success. The difficulty is that
if military necessity justifies the tactics of the guerrillas, it may also
justify at least some of the tactics employed against them. Professor
Taylor seems to incline toward the opinion that there should be a strong
presumption against involvement in hostilities against an enemy whose
tactics and strategy make it exceedingly difficult to resist him without
endangering people whose deepest desire is to take no part at all in the
fighting."2 But the logical end of this reasoning would be that an
aggressive power, determined to subject other people to its rule by
force, cannot be resisted, if only it is sufficiently unscrupulous-that is,
if it is willing to create conditions in which resistance will inevitably
bring suffering upon innocent people. It is in essence the problem of
the airplane hijacking.
Nevertheless, I do not think, and Professor Taylor does not think,
that a civilized power, or one which wishes to be civilized, must or
should scrap the laws of war simply because its enemy does so. At a
minimum, it can comply with the very basic provision of article III of
each of the Geneva Conventions, which provides that in the case of
armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the high contracting parties, "[p] ersons taking no active
part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have
laid down their arms . . . shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely . . . " ' and which provides that such persons shall not be

subjected to violence, murder, or the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court. More
broadly, it can refrain from violence which serves no military purpose
or which bears no reasonable proportion to the military end in view.
This is, of course, the declared policy of the United States and its allies,
who assert that the Geneva Conventions are fully applicable to the war
in Vietnam.
As Professor Taylor points out, these policies are already adequately implemented by regulations, orders, directives and so forth.14
The problem is adequate enforcement of those orders, particularly those
requiring reporting, investigation, and prosecution of violations of the
laws of war by American troops. Although there is little evidence that
higher commanders had any direct, affirmative responsibility for what
12 T. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 172, 173.
13 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and

Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. III, [19551 6 U.S.T. 3116,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 32 (No. 970) ; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. III, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3220, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75
U.N.T.S. 86 (No. 971); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. III, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3318, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S.
136 (No. 972) ; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. III, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3518, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 288 (No. 973).
14 T.

TAYLOR,

supra note 1, at 168-69.
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happened at Song My, there is some evidence to suggest, at least, that
as high as division headquarters there was little interest in investigating and prosecuting those who may have been responsible. Professor Tayor is clearly right in saying that the legal priciples of In re
Yamashita 15 are as applicable to American as to Japanese commanders;
it is their duty under both American and international law to take such
steps as are reasonably within their power "to insure compliance with
the law of war or to punish violators thereof." " I would hope, however, that no commander, American or foreign, will ever again be convicted on such evidence as that in the Yamashita case, or the similar
7
case of In re Hirota.1
This principle in turn requires that those whose personal morality
does not forbid such acts must be deterred by fear of punishment. If
investigation develops evidence of such clear-cut violations of the law
of war as seem to have occurred at Song My, there should be courtsmartial not only of those directly responsible but also of those who
condone such conduct or fail to take reasonable measures to prevent it.
I emphasize again that I have not as yet seen convincing evidence of
such condonation or acquiescence at higher levels of command. And
such trials should not be propaganda trials; like other courts-martial
for serious offenses, they should ensure the accused all the protection
to which he is entitled under the Uniform Code and the Constitution.
Such a course is not politically easy. Although the Army may
seem to be doing less than it should to prosecute violations of the law
of war committed by its own forces, it is doing more than has ever
been done by any other belligerent during hostilities. As Professor
Taylor makes clear, in the past the trial and punishment of war criminals
has almost invariably taken place after defeat and in the courts of a
totally victorious enemy. It is to the credit of the United States that
even prior to the breaking of the Song My story it had court-martialed
and convicted some of its own soldiers for crimes committed against
noncombatants and prisoners of war. We should continue this policy,
and more vigorously than we have in the past. A very large section
of the public will, as Professor Taylor points out, ask the very human
question why we should punish our own people for acts which the
enemy commits much oftener and more brutally, when that enemy not
only does not discourage such conduct by his own forces, but boasts
of it. The only possible answer, I think, is that we have been, and wish
to remain, a relatively civilized nation-I emphasize the word rela15 [1946] Ann. Dig. Pub. Int'l Law Cases 255 (1945) (No. 111) (U.S. Military
Comm'n, Manila), petition for habeas corpus & prohibition denied sub nom. Yamashita
v. Styer, 75 Philippine R. 563 (1945), cert. & leave to file petitions for writs of
habeas
corpus and prohibition denied, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
10 DEP'T OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 1 501

(1956); cf. id. 507(b).
17 [1948] Ann. Dig. Pub. Int'l Law Cases 356 (1948) (No. 118) (Int'l Military
Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo), leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus
denied sub nor. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948)

(per curiam).
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tively-with a tradition of respect for law, and that if we emulate the
enemy's brutality we lose not only the respect of other civilized nations,
but our self-respect.
The broader question raised by Professor Taylor, too broad to
discuss now, is whether it is possible to devise some minimum, fundamental law to mitigate the brutality of what Chairman Mao calls "wars
of national liberation." To have any chance of observance, such laws
must be acceptable even to belligerents like the Vietcong or the Arab
guerrillas in Palestine. (North Vietnam, of course, is in a different
position; I can see no military or political purpose of that government
which is served by its refusal to comply with the Geneva Prisoner of
War Convention.) It will not be easy to work out even such minimal
rules. And yet even the Palestinian guerrillas have little to gain from
firing rockets into school buses and killing children. At any rate,
lawyers and soldiers ought to give more thought to the shape of the
laws which might govern even the hit-and-run guerrilla wars which
have become common in many parts of the world in the last quarter
of a century.

